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Remedial and Coercive Administrative
Proceedings Under Younger: The Tenth Circuit’s
Test in Brown v. Day
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Brown v. Day1 highlights a
circuit split regarding the applicability of Younger abstention2 to state
administrative proceedings. This split is rooted in two Supreme
Court cases that have left lower courts with the difficult task of
fleshing out their meaning. In Patsy v. Board of Regents,3 the Court
held that exhausting administrative remedies was not required before
federal intervention could be sought under 42 U.S.C § 1983.4 In
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,5
however, the Court indicated that the non-exhaustion rule of Patsy
applied to remedial, rather than coercive, administrative
proceedings.6 Since Dayton Christian Schools, circuit courts have
struggled in applying and dissecting the meaning of the Court’s
remedial/coercive distinction.7
This Note analyzes two key issues at the forefront of the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Brown. First, the court offers a test for
determining the remedial or coercive nature of an administrative
proceeding that focuses solely on the “ongoing proceeding” prong
of Younger. This Note explores whether such a test is reasonable and
whether it falls in line with federal abstention jurisprudence. Second,
this Note addresses the court’s narrow and mechanical treatment of
the remedial/coercive distinction. Brown deviates from a traditional
1. 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. “Younger abstention” refers to the judicially created doctrine of federal abstention
first articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
4. Id. at 516.
5. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
6. Id. at 627–28 n.2.
7. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 896 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting)
(discussing the divergent approaches adopted by the circuit courts in applying the
remedial/coercive distinction).
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Younger analysis, which requires an organic evaluation of the
principles of equity, federalism, and comity that federal courts must
explicitly consider in deciding whether to abstain from a state
administrative proceeding.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN BROWN V. DAY
A. Facts of the Case
Dena Brown, the plaintiff, is a severely mentally disabled adult.8
Her disability has left her with the mental capacity of a three- or
four-year-old child.9 Due to her extreme disability, Brown requires
constant care and supervision.10 Prior to the commencement of her
lawsuit, Brown lived and received care at a private, non-profit
residential care facility.11 The cost of such care exceeded her monthly
income, which consisted solely of Social Security payments.12 Prior to
August 2005, the federal Medicaid program covered the difference
in Brown’s income versus her cost of care.13
In 2003, Brown’s mother passed away, leaving her as the
beneficiary of a residuary trust.14 The corpus of the trust included
roughly $15,000 in cash, two annuities totaling approximately
$23,000, and a 160-acre piece of land valued around $30,000.15
Brown’s brother was appointed as the trustee, and Brown, given her
disability, had no legal authority to compel distribution of the trust
income or corpus at any time.16 As such, prior to 2004, the state of
Kansas did not consider the trust an “available resource” in
determining Brown’s Medicaid eligibility.17
In July 2004, however, the Kansas legislature amended the law
dealing with Medicaid eligibility to include within the definition of

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Brown, 555 F.3d at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“available resources” trust assets “to the extent, using the full extent
of discretion, the trustee may make any of the income or principal
available to the applicant or recipient of medical assistance.”18 Per the
requirements of the revised statute, the Kansas Division of Health
Policy and Finance (“HPF”) informed Brown that her Medicaid
benefits would be terminated at the end of August 2005.19
B. Procedural History
Brown first sought relief from the termination of her Medicaid
benefits by requesting a hearing before the HPF. She opted for the
HPF hearing, instead of initially filing suit in federal court, because
there was a legitimate question as to whether the amended statute
could apply to her retroactively. Furthermore, the HPF allowed her
to continue receiving Medicaid benefits during the pendency of her
appeal. The hearing officer restored Brown’s benefits on the grounds
that the amended statute did not apply retroactively. However, a
Final Order issued by Robert Day, HPF’s director, informed Brown
that the previous decision to terminate her benefits was being
reinstated. The Order further stated that Brown had thirty days to
file a petition for state judicial review.20
A few days prior to the expiration of the allowable time period
for Brown to seek state judicial review, she filed suit in federal district
court naming Day, in his official capacity as director of HPF, as the
defendant. Brown sought declaratory judgment and an injunction of
the termination of her Medicaid coverage. The remedies sought were
based upon Brown’s claim that Day’s decision violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983.21
The district court initially granted Brown’s request for a
preliminary injunction. The court found that Day and HPF had
acted arbitrarily in terminating Brown’s Medicaid coverage. Shortly
after the court’s ruling, Day moved to have the case dismissed,
arguing the court should abstain from hearing Brown’s claims given
that she had abandoned a current state proceeding to seek federal

18.
19.
20.
21.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(e)(3)(B) (2008 Supp.).
Brown, 555 F.3d at 886.
Id.
Id. at 886–87.
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review. The district court agreed with Day and dismissed, citing
Younger. The court found there was an ongoing state proceeding
that, under the circumstances, required the federal judiciary to
respect the state’s interest in adjudicating the matter. Brown then
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.22
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Roots and Development of “Our Federalism”23
Traditionally, Ex parte Young24 is considered to be the genesis of
Younger abstention.25 In that case, the Supreme Court issued an
injunction against the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing
a state statute dealing with reductions in railroad rates. In making its
decision, however, the Court noted that the federal judiciary could
not “interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending
in a state court.”26 A subsequent line of decisions by the Court
established the principle that a federal court could not enjoin the
bringing of a state prosecution except under extraordinary
circumstances.27
Although the basic tenets of “Our Federalism” can be found in
pre-Younger cases, the Court, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,28 appeared to
have opened the doors to the federal courts for those seeking

22. Id. at 887.
23. “Our Federalism” is synonymous with Younger abstention. The Court in Younger
used the phrase in a discussion concerning the delicate nature of the relationship between the
states and the federal government:
[T]he concept . . . represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
25. MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS 532 n.1 (6th ed. 2007). But see Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974) (arguing that preYoung, the federal trial courts had freely given injunctive relief to federal plaintiffs).
26. Young, 209 U.S. at 162.
27. See REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 25.
28. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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protection from threatened criminal prosecution.29 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, maintained that federal intervention, under
Dombrowski, was only appropriate in cases dealing with the threat of
future prosecutions, not a currently pending prosecution.30
However, the apparent departure from previous precedent by the
Court created uncertainty and confusion regarding the role of the
federal judiciary as it pertained to pending or future state
prosecutions.31
The perception of expansive federal judicial oversight created by
Dombrowski was narrowed in Younger v. Harris.32 The Court’s
opinion in Younger, along with other forms of judicially created
doctrines of abstention, requires that federal courts give great
deference to state proceedings in the name of equity, federalism, and
comity.33 Under Younger, the federal courts are required to abstain
from hearing a complaint if (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding,
(2) the state court provides an adequate forum to adjudicate the
federal rights, and (3) the state proceeding involves an important
state interest.34 Thus, Younger narrowed Dombrowski by holding that
the federal courts are open only for complaints seeking protection
from state prosecutions that would inflict irreparable harm upon the
federal plaintiff.35 The scope of Younger abstention was traditionally

29. Robert Allen Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1970).
30. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485–86.
31. See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979).
32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). A year after Younger was decided, the Court, in Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was an expressly authorized
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. After Mitchum, the Anti-Injunction Act posed no barrier
for plaintiffs seeking relief from state court proceedings in federal courts; however, Younger
abstention still acts as a gatekeeper in promoting equity, federalism, and comity between the
state and federal courts. Id. at 242–43. Therefore, § 1983 federal plaintiffs still face Younger as
a bar in trying to bring their cases before a federal court.
33. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.
34. Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Younger, 401 U.S.
at 37).
35. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Additionally, the Court offered two additional exceptions to Younger abstention but left the
door open for more. The first exception applies to cases involving a clear showing by the
plaintiff of bad faith or harassment by state officials. The second exception is truly remarkable
in that courts may intervene if the challenged statute is “‘flagrantly and patently violative of
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left only for criminal proceedings; however, Younger has since been
applied to quasi-criminal proceedings in the civil and administrative
context.
B. The Expansion of Younger to Non-Criminal Proceedings
1. Younger in civil proceedings
In Huffman v. Pursue, LTD.,36 the Court extended Younger to a
civil proceeding in which the state was a party. The proceeding was
centered on a state nuisance statute that allowed the state, in effect,
to shut down any establishment in violation of the statute’s broad
terms.37 In Huffman, the establishment in question was a movie
theater showing pornographic films.38 After losing at trial in state
court, the operators of the theater sought injunctive relief in federal
court.39 The Supreme Court held that Younger required federal
abstention because the “state proceeding . . . [was] akin to a criminal
prosecution.”40 Thus, the Court held, “the State’s interest in the
nuisance litigation [was] likely to be every bit as great as it would be
were this a criminal proceeding.”41
Two years later, the Court held that Younger applied to a case
involving a state contempt proceeding in Juidice v. Vail.42 In Juidice,
a judgment debtor sought injunctive relief from the federal court
system after he was held in contempt by the state court.43 The federal
district court granted the injunction, but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Younger applied because “[t]he contempt
power lies at the core of the administration of a State’s judicial
system.”44
express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.’” Id. at 53–54 (quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
36. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
37. Id. at 595–97.
38. Id. at 595.
39. Id. at 598.
40. Id. at 604.
41. Id.
42. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
43. Id. at 328–29.
44. Id. at 335.
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The same year that Juidice was decided, the Supreme Court
applied Younger to a state civil suit filed by the state in order to
recoup fraudulently received welfare benefits in Trainor v.
Hernandez.45 The recipients of the welfare benefits sought injunctive
relief in federal court.46 The Supreme Court declined to give a
definitive statement regarding the application of Younger to civil
proceedings, but it did find abstention appropriate. The Court
focused on the important state interest that was involved with
administering welfare programs in making its decision to apply
Younger.47
Finally, the high-water mark for Younger in the setting of a civil
proceeding, and the current standard employed today, is found in
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco.48 Pennzoil involved a case where the state was
not even a named party in the civil action. In that case, Texaco was
found liable for actual and punitive damages exceeding $11 billion.49
Texaco intended to appeal the award, but a Texas statute required
that to postpone enforcement of the $11 billion judgment, Texaco
would need to post bail for the amount of the award plus costs and
interest.50 Rather than post bond, Texaco sought to enjoin Pennzoil
in federal court from enforcing the judgment.51 The Supreme Court
held the federalism concerns found in Younger required federal
abstention “not only when the pending state proceedings are
criminal, but also when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the
State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of
the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the
States and the National Government.”52 It is not entirely clear
whether Pennzoil broadens the reach of Younger abstention to all
civil proceedings.53

45. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
46. Id. at 435–38.
47. Id. at 444.
48. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 4–5.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 11.
53. See Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches A Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1032 (1989).
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2. Younger in administrative proceedings
Younger abstention in civil proceedings seems rather
uncontroversial given (1) the adequacy of the state forum to
adjudicate federal civil claims and (2) the fact that civil litigation
likely involves important state interests. Although these two prongs
of Younger are not always satisfied in civil proceedings,
administrative proceedings are even more susceptible in failing to
offer an adequate forum for the adjudication of federal rights or to
demonstrate the involvement of an important state interest. This,
however, has not prevented the Court from extending Younger to
administrative proceedings under certain circumstances.
In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n,54 the Court applied Younger to a federal claim for injunctive
relief against a state attorney disciplinary proceeding on the grounds
that the proceeding “[bore] a close relationship to proceedings
criminal in nature, as in Huffman . . . .”55 In evaluating whether the
administrative proceeding was the type of proceeding requiring
Younger deference, the Court noted that the state had “an extremely
important interest in maintaining and assuring the professional
conduct of the attorneys it licenses.”56
The same year that Middlesex was decided, the Court held in
Patsy v. Board of Regents57 that a teacher seeking damages under §
1983 for sex discrimination need not exhaust her administrative
remedies before seeking federal review of the violation of her federal
rights.58 Following Mitchum v. Foster,59 the Court found that
Congress, when it enacted § 1983, had expressly mandated that the
federal judiciary assume jurisdiction for claims brought under that
statute.60 The decision of the Court gave great weight to the mistrust
that Congress had shown towards the inadequate, potentially biased,
fact-finding processes of state administrative bodies.61
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

457 U.S. 423 (1982).
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434.
457 U.S. 496 (1982).
Id. at 516.
407 U.S. 225 (1972); see supra note 32.
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 503.
Patsy, 457 U.S. at 505–06.
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Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools62
involved a subject matter similar to Patsy. In that case, Dayton
Christian Schools sought, under § 1983, to prevent the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission from hearing a sex discrimination complaint.63
The Commission moved for dismissal under Younger. The Court’s
opinion considered all components of Younger abstention in
evaluating whether the administrative proceeding was the type of
proceeding that deserved federal deference. After considering the
interests of the state in the proceeding and the adequacy of the
forum, the Court, in a footnote, distinguished Patsy on the grounds
that the proceeding before the Court was coercive, while the
proceeding in Patsy was remedial.64 No explanation or additional
treatment was given to this remedial/coercive distinction. In the
context of the opinion, however, it seems that it was one of many
factors used by the Court in evaluating the entirety of the Younger
doctrine.65 The failure of the Court to explain this distinction has led
to the current circuit split.66
3. A seven-ten split? Confusion among the courts in applying the
remedial/coercive distinction
Judge Tymkovich, dissenting in Brown, points out the current
split among the circuit courts in handling the remedial/coercive
distinction.67 On one side, the First and Tenth Circuits have
implemented a mechanical, multi-pronged test that focuses on who
initiated the administrative proceeding.68 If the proceeding was
initiated by the federal plaintiff, then the proceeding is remedial; if
the proceeding was initiated by the state, it is coercive.69 On the
other side, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have taken a

62. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
63. Id. at 621.
64. Id. at 627 n.2.
65. Id. at 627 (“We have also applied [Younger] to state administrative proceedings in
which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the
federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim.”).
66. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 896 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. See Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1987).
69. Brown, 555 F.3d at 889.
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broader, more flexible approach by simply “asking whether the
proceedings can be characterized as state enforcement
proceedings.”70 In making this query, these circuits have held that a
state enforcement proceeding is by definition coercive, which makes
such proceedings “judicial in nature.”71
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
A. The Court’s Interpretation of the Younger Framework
The Tenth Circuit in Brown reversed the district court’s decision
to abstain from a state administrative proceeding dealing with the
termination of Medicaid benefits to a mentally handicapped person.72
The court acknowledged three requirements that, if satisfied,
demand federal abstention under Younger: (1) the presence of an
ongoing state proceeding (the “ongoing proceeding” prong), (2) a
showing that the state administrative proceeding “provides an
adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint”
(the “adequacy” prong), and (3) the involvement of an important
state interest (the “state interest” prong).73
Within this framework, the court states that the analysis in
determining the applicability of Younger to Brown turns solely on
evaluating the “ongoing proceeding” prong.74 Within the “ongoing
proceeding” prong, the court identifies two sub-parts that guide the
analysis: (1) whether there was an ongoing state proceeding, and (2)
whether the proceeding is the type of proceeding (the “type of
proceeding” analysis) deserving of Younger deference.75 The court
avoids addressing the first sub-part and focuses its analysis only on
the “type of proceeding” sub-part. To determine if the putative
70. Id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (citing Laurel Sand & Gravel v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 2008);
Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2007); O’Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32
F.3d 785, 791 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994)).
72. See supra Part II.
73. Brown, 555 F.3d at 887.
74. See id. at 888.
75. Id. (“The initial prong of the Younger inquiry involves two sub-parts. This court
must determine whether there is an ongoing state proceeding. The court must also decide
whether that proceeding is the type of state proceeding that is due the deference accorded by
Younger abstention.” (citations omitted)).
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proceeding is the type of proceeding meriting Younger abstention,
the court asks if, following Dayton Christian Schools,76 the
proceeding is remedial or coercive.77 This query, the court
determines, can be evaluated by applying an additional threepronged test based upon the standard articulated by the First
Circuit.78
B. The Remedial vs. Coercive Distinction
The Tenth Circuit’s remedial/coercive test evaluates (1)
“whether the federal plaintiff initiated the state proceeding of her
own volition to right a wrong inflicted by the state”79 (if so, the
proceeding is remedial); (2) whether “the federal plaintiff contends
that the state proceeding is unlawful (coercive),”80 or whether “the
federal plaintiff seeks a remedy for some other state-inflicted wrong
(remedial)”;81 and (3) whether the federal plaintiff has committed
some bad act (coercive).82 In analyzing only the remedial/coercive
distinction within the vacuum of the “ongoing proceeding” prong,
the court, by design, gives no express treatment to the adequacy of
the proceeding or the possible interest that the state might have in
such a proceeding. By limiting its analysis in such a way, the court is
able to sidestep the tension between Patsy83 and Huffman84
regarding the conflicting exhaustion requirements of those cases.85

76. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
77. Brown, 555 F.3d at 888–90.
78. Id. at 889–91.
79. Id. at 889.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 891.
83. 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
84. 420 U.S. 592, 607–11 (1975).
85. Brown, 555 F.3d at 890 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627–28 n.2 (1986)). A more difficult task, perhaps, than giving meaning
to the remedial/coercive distinction, would be reconciling the apparent conflict between
Patsy’s non-exhaustion of state administrative remedies rule and Huffman’s exhaustion of state
appellate review requirement. The difficulty of that task lies in determining when application of
Patsy ends and when application of Huffman begins. In other words, at what point does an
administrative proceeding, which does not require exhaustion, become an appellate
proceeding, which does require exhaustion? The facts of Brown highlight this problem because
Brown had already gone through the administrative proceeding. Id. at 886. Her next option
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In applying the above mentioned test to Brown’s administrative
proceedings, the court found them to be remedial because (1)
Brown initiated the proceedings, (2) the administrative “proceedings
themselves [were] not the challenged state conduct,” and (3) Brown
“committed no cognizable bad act that would have precipitated state
coercive proceedings.”86 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district
court’s finding that the state had initiated the proceedings by
eliminating Brown’s Medicaid benefits in the first place.87 The court
did not accept that the decision to terminate Brown’s Medicaid
benefits fit within Younger’s “traditional roots” that allows for the
expansion of federal abstention doctrine to proceedings similar to a
criminal prosecution. In other words, Younger applies “in situations
where federal involvement would block a state’s efforts to enforce its
laws.”88 It appears the court argued that Younger does not apply to
an administrative proceeding seeking relief from the summarily
terminated Medicaid benefits of an individual given the absence of
even the veneer of judicial process.89 If this is the case, such an
argument would be consistent with Justice Scalia’s statement in New
Orleans Public Service v. Council of New Orleans90 that the Supreme
Court has “never extended [Younger] to proceedings that are not
‘judicial in nature.’”91
V. ANALYSIS
The critique of the Brown decision offered by this Note is not
aimed at contrasting and comparing the different approaches taken
by the circuit courts in applying the coercive/remedial distinction.

was to seek state judicial review of the administrative proceeding from a state trial court. The
court is able to completely avoid this issue by limiting its analysis to the remedial/coercive
distinction within its interpretation of the Younger framework.
86. Id. at 893.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citations omitted).
89. See Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“Huffman is a reliable guide only where full-fledged state administrative proceedings of a
judicial character and, arguably, of a coercive nature, are directed against the federal
plaintiff.”).
90. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
91. Id. at 370 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n.,
457 U.S. 423, 433–34 (1982)).
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Judge Tymkovich, dissenting, lays out an excellent argument as to
why the approach taken by the several other circuits should be
followed instead of the test adopted by the First Circuit.92 Nor is the
purpose of this Note to challenge the result reached by the Tenth
Circuit. The limited and narrow focus of this Note is simply to ask
whether the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is logically consistent and
generally consistent with Younger abstention jurisprudence. The
answer to both inquiries is no.
The means by which the Tenth Circuit achieved the result in
Brown is not conducive to the broad, free-flowing discussions
regarding equity, federalism, and comity usually found in Younger
abstention cases. The court appears to view the remedial/coercive
analysis of an administrative proceeding in a binary fashion. That is,
an administrative proceeding is either remedial or it is coercive
depending upon the application of a few simple factors. This vision
would justify the mechanical test adopted by the court; however, the
heart of Younger is a careful balancing test that pits the interests of
the federal judiciary in protecting federal rights against the interests
of the states in furthering matters of state law and policy.93 The
Tenth Circuit test, unfortunately, substitutes the nuanced flexibility
of a traditional Younger analysis with a bright-lined, multi-pronged
test that fails to capture the core concepts of “Our Federalism.”
A. Does Brown’s Treatment of the Remedial/Coercive Distinction
Make Sense?
As previously stated, it is currently unclear how much weight
courts should give the remedial/coercive distinction or how and
when it should be applied within the broader framework of Younger
abstention.94 The Tenth Circuit, as previously explained, has created
a sub-prong to the first part of the Younger analysis, namely the
ongoing proceeding prong.95 The purpose of this sub-prong is to
evaluate whether a proceeding is the type of proceeding that should

92.
93.
94.
95.

Brown, 555 F.3d at 894–906 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).
Brown, 555 F.3d at 896–97 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
Id. at 888 (majority opinion).
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be given Younger deference.96 This construction of Younger places
the entire weight of the analysis within the sterile confines of the
court’s own remedial/coercive test with no consideration given to
the adequacy of the state forum or the state’s interest in the matter.
Without further explanation from the court, it is difficult to
understand why an analysis of whether a certain type of proceeding
should be given Younger deference is placed solely within a
discussion of Younger’s ongoing proceeding prong. After all, the
million dollar question behind every Younger abstention case is
whether the proceeding is the type of proceeding meriting federal
deference. The court relies on New Orleans Public Service in
justifying its type of proceeding analysis; however, the analysis in
New Orleans Public Service does not call upon an analysis as
constructed by the Tenth Circuit. The adequacy and state interest
prongs of Younger should also be evaluated because the type of
proceeding analysis has implications that permeate the entire
Younger discussion.
It seems obvious that an analysis of the ongoing proceeding
prong would include a discussion of whether the putative proceeding
is the type of proceeding that deserves Younger deference. The
Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply this discussion to the rest of
Younger, however, is where the court’s test begins to come undone.
The type of proceeding analysis inherently requires an evaluation of
the adequacy of the state forum to hear the federal complaint and
the state’s interest in the underlying matter. How can a federal court
decide if a proceeding is the type deserving of federal abstention
without expressly evaluating the adequacy of the state forum or the
state’s interest in adjudicating the matter? The Tenth Circuit
attempts to avoid the adequacy and state interest prongs of Younger,
but the influence of those factors can be found beneath the surface
of the court’s decision.97
The remedial/coercive distinction is especially relevant in
evaluating the state’s interest in an administrative proceeding.
Although no explanation is offered by the Supreme Court, a
96. Id.
97. It seems reasonable to speculate that the court’s narrow application of the
remedial/coercive distinction was done to avoid the greater uncertainty surrounding the Patsy
and Huffman exhaustion requirements. See supra note 85.
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reasonable argument for the denial of Younger deference to remedial
proceedings is that such proceedings, generally, will not involve
important matters of state interest that would require federal
abstention. This presumes that states have a greater interest in
coercive proceedings that enforce state laws than in proceedings that
merely seek to remedy a wrong done to an individual by the state.
Using the remedial/coercive distinction in determining the extent of
the interest that a state has in an administrative proceeding as part of
the “type of proceeding” analysis is a better way to organically apply
Younger in its entirety, rather than the mechanical,
compartmentalized test offered by the Tenth Circuit.
Furthermore, the remedial/coercive distinction naturally assists
in evaluating Younger’s adequacy prong as well. New Orleans Public
Service tells us that the elements of Younger are to be evaluated by
determining whether the putative proceeding is “judicial in
nature.”98 This follows because, presumably, a proceeding that is
judicial in nature will likely provide an adequate forum to adjudicate
the federal issues underlying the federal complaint. In asking
whether a proceeding is judicial in nature, an analysis of the
remedial/coercive status of the proceeding would be helpful in
further evaluating the adequacy of the state forum because a
proceeding that is coercive, e.g., a proceeding in which the state
seeks to enforce its laws, will likely provide a sufficient process by
which a state defendant may have her federal complaint properly
heard. Assuming the state has an interest in enforcing its laws and
protecting the federal rights of its citizens, it seems reasonable that
the state will provide adequate, judicial-like forums to enforce those
laws. Thus, Brown offers an inadequate treatment of the
remedial/coercive distinction, as the court should have applied the
distinction to all parts of the Younger analysis.
B. Is Brown Consistent with the Broad Principles of Younger
Abstention?
Brown’s creation of a test consisting of a convoluted maze of
prongs and their sub-prongs is at odds with the core principles of
98. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370
(1989).
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“Our Federalism.” Essentially, Brown turned on the fact that Brown
(1) initiated the administrative proceeding, (2) was challenging the
application of a new law rather than the lawfulness of the
proceeding, and (3) committed no bad act. As previously argued, the
remedial/coercive distinction seems to require consideration of all
factors that make up the Younger analysis. The three prongs of
Younger, identified by the Tenth Circuit, set out to evaluate just
how important a given proceeding is to a state. The interest of the
federal judiciary in adjudicating federal rights is presumed. Only by a
showing that a state’s interest in a proceeding is of sufficient
importance should a federal court abstain for the sake of avoiding the
potentially harmful friction between state and federal governments
that Younger abstention is designed to prevent.
It is hard to see where in the Tenth Circuit’s test there is room
for the careful balancing of state and federal interests as required by
Younger. It could be argued that such a discussion is imbedded
within the three sub-prongs found in the court’s test; however, it is
just as reasonable, if not more so, to argue that a nuanced
application of a traditional Younger analysis will be lost in the
mechanics of the court’s standard. The Tenth Circuit’s multipronged test does not embody the principles of equity, federalism,
and comity that require explicit consideration under Younger.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit’s test in Brown may have the appearance of a
clean, predictable legal standard; however, the court’s isolated
application of the remedial/coercive distinction to only the ongoing
proceeding prong of Younger contradicts the notion of “Our
Federalism.” Federal abstention jurisprudence has demonstrated over
time that Younger abstention is an extremely fact-sensitive endeavor.
To implement a test that focuses on a narrow set of factors, without
considering the adequacy of the state forum or the interests of the
state explicitly, prevents the federal courts from being able to
properly balance the competing interests of the federal and state
governments that are at the core of “Our Federalism.” Although the
outcome reached in Brown v. Day is what may be required under
Younger, the standard articulated by the Tenth Circuit is
unsupported by federal abstention jurisprudence.
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